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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald Anderson appeals from his judgment of conviction, claiming that several 
incidents of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments deprived him of his 
state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. The State 
concedes that there were two incidents of misconduct, but contends the remainder of 
the offending statements constituted proper arguments on the evidence. However, 
those statements are still misconduct even though the prosecutor made other, 
permissible arguments, because the prosecutor departed from the proper scope of 
argument by improperly interjecting his personal beliefs and opinions about the 
credibility of witnesses and disparaging the defense presented. As the district court 
indicated, the jury could have entertained reasonable doubts as to Mr. Anderson's guilt 
based on the evidence presented, and therefore, the prejudice caused by each 
individual instance of misconduct should cause this Court to vacate Mr. Anderson's 
conviction. Certainly, the aggregation of all the incidents of misconduct would merit that 
result in this case. 
Additionally, upon filing his appeal, Mr. Anderson learned that the district court 
failed to maintain a copy of the written post-proof jury instructions (Nos. 9 through 20) 
provided to the jurors during their deliberations. As they constitute a necessary part of 
the appellate record and may be the basis for appellate relief if they erroneously present 
the law, either in the actual words or in the manner in which that information is 
presented, the fact that those written instructions are unavailable for appellate review 
violates Mr. Anderson's right to due process. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by failing to preserve the post-proof jury 
instructions in the record, thus depriving Mr. Anderson of his right to due process. 
2. Whether Mr. Anderson's conviction should be vacated because of prosecutorial 
misconduct by vouching for evidence, misstating the law, disparaging the 
defense, and commenting on the veracity of Mr. Anderson's testimony. 
3. Whether the accumulation of errors in this case deprived Mr. Anderson of a fair 
trial. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Failing To PreseNe The Post-Proof Jury Instructions In The 
Record, Thus Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Right To Due Process 
A. Introduction 
The district court's failure to preserve an adequate record for review violated 
Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to due process by depriving him of a fundamentally 
fair appellate proceeding. The written jury instructions are a necessary part of the 
appellate record. They may be challenged on appeal, both for content (the actual words 
used) and for presentation (the manner in which those words are laid out). An error in 
either regard may justify appellate relief. As such, because there is a reasonable 
possibility the jurors could have relied on the erroneous written instructions which are 
taken into deliberations rather than their memories of the oral instructions, a transcript of 
the oral recitation of those instructions is insufficient to cure this error. Because the 
written instructions are not available for Mr. Anderson's review and challenge, he has 
been deprived of his constitutional right to due process. As such, this Court should 
vacate his conviction. 
B. By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated 
Mr. Anderson's Due Process Rights 
The State concedes that the post-proof instructions are missing and are not 
able to be located. (Resp. Br., p.11 n.6.) As such, it concedes the error, and focuses 
its response on whether or not Mr. Anderson was prejudiced by that error. (See Resp. 
Br., pp.11-16.) It is wrong inasmuch as it contends Mr. Anderson was not prejudiced; 
4 
the failure to preserve a written copy of the post-proof instructions did prejudice 
Mr. Anderson. 
The point of the due process protections in regard to the record on appellate 
review is to allow the defendant an adequate opportunity to review the proceedings 
below for error. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963) ("What [is] 
impermissible [is] the total denial to petitioners of any means of getting adequate review 
on the merits [of their claims]."). The district court's failure to preserve the record for 
review violates the defendant's right to due process by depriving the proceedings of 
the necessary fundamental fairness. 1 See, e.g., State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318 
(1991); State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 
630, 636 (1967). This right guarantees that the defendant will be provided with "a 
record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate review of the errors alleged regarding 
the proceedings below." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002).) 
Historically, the written instructions have been considered "an essential part of 
the record on appeal." State v. Upham, 52 Idaho 340, _, 14 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1932). 
The reason is "[t]he written instructions, or a copy thereof, shall be given to each juror to 
take when the jury retires for deliberation." I.C.R. 30(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
since the written instructions are what the jurors would presumably have relied on if they 
had questions in regard to the governing law during their deliberations, the written 
instructions need to be included in the appellate record for review. As such, their 
absence deprived Mr. Anderson of an adequate appellate record, thereby prejudicing 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
5 
him - he was not afforded any opportunity to review that necessary part of the record 
for error. 
In this case, Mr. Anderson appealed, challenging his judgment of conviction. 
(R., p.85.) In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson articulated two ways in which 
the jury instructions may have been erroneous - they may misstate the law or they may 
differ from the oral instructions. (See App. Br., pp.15-16.) Therefore, when the record 
necessary for review of those contentions is not available, 
but had a record been available [that] might have substantiated the 
defendant's allegation that there was prejudicial error in those 
proceedings, a judgment of conviction based upon [those] proceedings 
cannot be sustained; otherwise the defendant has been denied due 
process in violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the 
State of Idaho. 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990) (quoting State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 235-
36 (1975), Bakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). Thus, the absence of these 
necessary instructions, which might have substantiated such allegations means that 
Mr. Anderson was prejudiced and his constitutional rights violated by the failure to 
maintain copies of the written instructions. 
Specifically, the written jury instructions can be challenged in a few different 
ways. They may improperly state the law, or they may present the instructions 
erroneously. See State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589-92 (2011). In Draper, the 
defendant challenged the manner in which the instruction presented the law, in that the 
defendant-appellant was challenging the way in which the instruction listed the elements 
of the offense. See id. He was not challenging the phrasing, the actual words used, 
and there was no indication that the particular section in question was not a correct 
6 
statement of the law.2 See id. Rather, the asserted error was that one of the elements 
of the offense was mislabeled, appearing instead as one of several potential overt acts, 
as opposed to a separate element. See id. The Idaho Supreme Court took pains to 
note that the district court had attempted to correct that error by interlineation. Id. at 590 
n.3, 591. Nevertheless, even with that correction in place, the Idaho Supreme Court 
found that there was no way to know how the jury had viewed that written instruction. 
Id. at 590-91. Therefore, since the jury could have misread the instruction based on the 
erroneous presentation of the law, even though the actual language of the instruction 
was correct, the Idaho Supreme Court found the instruction to be erroneous. Id. at 591. 
As a result of that error in the presentation of the instruction, the Idaho Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of conviction. Id. at 591-92. 
Furthermore, the oral instruction does not necessarily cure an error with the 
written instruction. See, e.g., State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332 (Ct. App. 2007). In 
Amelia, the jury was orally instructed by the district court prior to counsel's closing 
statements. Id. at 336. There is no indication that the oral instruction was an incorrect 
statement of the law. See generally id. However, when the jury retired to deliberate, 
it was given a written instruction which was different than the oral instruction. Id. at 
334-35. The written instruction was a correct statement of the law. Id. Nevertheless, 
even though the jury had received correct statements of the law, the Court of Appeals 
vacated the conviction because of the prejudice caused by the difference between the 
2 In fact, the language describing a charge of conspiracy is the same as used in the 
form jury instruction. Compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-90, with ICJI 1101. 
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oral and written instructions. Id. at 336. As such, a transcript of the oral instruction 
does not cure the absence of the written instructions from the record. See id. 
In this case, since the instructions are missing from the district court's file, 
Mr. Anderson cannot compare them with the oral recitation to see if there is an 
Amelia-type error in his case. Additionally, the oral recitation does not delineate 
between the different instructions, much less between any subdivisions therein. 3 
(See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.8 - p.90, L.25.) As such, the prejudice caused to 
Mr. Anderson is evident, even without a specific articulation as to an error within those 
instructions (i.e., the abstract prejudice) which, according to the Idaho Supreme Court 
may (though not always) rise to constitutional dimensions. Walters, 120 Idaho at 49; 
Wright, 97 Idaho at 231. 
In this case, that abstract prejudice does rise to constitutional dimensions. For 
example, even if Mr. Anderson could articulate a specific error in the instructions based 
on the incomplete record provided him, "without a copy of the proposed jury instruction 
this Court would be without sufficient information to evaluate [the propriety of the 
instruction]." State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 (Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, without 
the written instructions, there would be insufficient information to evaluate the propriety 
of the written instructions. See id.; compare Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-92. Therefore, 
even if Mr. Anderson were to assert some particular error in the written instructions, the 
absence of a copy of the written instructions in the record means his challenge could 
3 The successful challenge in Draper hinged on the way in which the written instruction 
was subdivided within the instruction. Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-92. As such, without 
the written instructions, Mr. Anderson is deprived of the ability to review for such errors 
by the district court's failure to maintain its record. 
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not be successful, even if he were correct as to the error itself. See, e.g., 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, where a pertinent portion 
of the record is missing, it is presumed to support the actions of the trial court). As a 
result, Mr. Anderson has been deprived of the ability to conduct an adequate review of 
the record in his case and raise the viable issues possibly supported therein, which is a 
deprivation of the constitutional right to due process. 
Ultimately, it amounts to a deprivation of Mr. Anderson's opportunity to make 
such challenges. '"When a person ... [is] deprived, through no fault of his own, of the 
opportunity of affirmatively establishing facts to demonstrate the legality or illegality of 
his incarceration, a fundamental lack of fairness in the judicial process is established."' 
Walters, 120 Idaho at 51 (quoting Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50) (emphasis in italics 
from Walters, emphasis in bold added); see also Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. Thus, it is 
the deprivation of the opportunity to challenge the instructions, not, as the State seems 
to believe, a specific impropriety in the instructions themselves, 4 which constitutes the 
4 In fact, the State demands Mr. Anderson articulate a particular challenge to one of the 
post-proof instructions. ( See Resp. Br., p.13 ("[Mr. Anderson] has failed to identify 
specifically what it is about the missing written jury instruction that he wishes 
to challenge .... ").) This takes a far too narrow view of the argument regarding 
prejudice. As the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed in Walters, it is the deprivation of the 
opportunity to make such challenges that violates due process. Walters, 120 Idaho at 
51. The State would create a circular standard, where, in order to assert a due process 
challenge due to the absence of a necessary document from the record, the appellant 
would have to know not only the contents of that document, but the error contained 
therein, all without ever having seen the document. Additionally, the appellant would 
have to convince the appellate court of that error without being afforded the opportunity 
to present evidence in support of that assertion. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in 
Walsh, when that is the case, the appellant fails to meet its burden of proof and will 
lose. See Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877. As such, the State's proposed standard would 
effectively deprive an appellant of any review of his case, which, as the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recognized, deprives the proceedings of fundamental fairness. Walters, 120 
Idaho at 51 (quoting Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50). 
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violation of Mr. Anderson's constitutional rights in this case. That is the "abstract 
prejudice" discussed in Walters, and since fundamental fairness, absent in this case, is 
required by the constitutional protection of due process, that abstract prejudice does 
rise to the constitutional dimension. See Walters, 120 Idaho at 49-51. 
Therefore, because the district court failed to maintain a copy of an adequate 
record for review by failing to maintain a copy of the written post-proof jury instructions, 
Mr. Anderson was prejudiced, as he was deprived of the opportunity to adequately 
review and challenge his judgment of conviction in violation of his constitutional right to 
due process. As such, this Court should vacate his conviction. 
11. 
Mr. Anderson's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
By Vouching For Evidence, Misstating The Law, Disparaging The Defense, And 
Commenting On The Veracity Of Mr. Anderson's Testimony 
A Introduction 
Mr. Anderson contends that several statements made by the prosecutor during 
closing arguments constitute misconduct. Given the nature of the evidence in this case 
(which, according to even the district court, is not at all overwhelming), there is a 
reasonable possibility that those comments impacted the jury's decision, thereby 
prejudicing Mr. Anderson. As a result, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's 
conviction because those comments deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 
As there were no contemporaneous objections to the prosecutor's comments, 
10 
Mr. Anderson has raised these claims as fundamental error pursuant to State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209 (2010).5 
The State concedes that two of those statements, one vouching for the evidence 
the State presented and the other disparaging the defense, were erroneous. Given the 
state of the evidence presented, each individual instance of misconduct prejudiced 
Mr. Anderson and justifies granting him relief. The aggregation of those statements, 
constituting multiple types of misconduct, definitely prejudiced Mr. Anderson, in that 
there is a reasonable possibility that the combination of those inappropriate comments 
impacted the outcome of the trial. As such, each of those two statements constitutes 
fundamental error, and the State has not argued that those errors were harmless. 
Therefore, based on those two statements alone, this Court should vacate 
Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
In regard to the other statements identified by Mr. Anderson, the State contends 
that they were proper comments on the evidence. Those statements, however, depart 
from the scope of proper argument because the prosecutor interjected his personal 
opinions and beliefs as to the reliability of witnesses and the defense presented; he did 
not state reasonable inferences based on the evidence itself. Therefore, those other 
comments do, in fact, constitute misconduct. They also implicate Mr. Anderson's 
constitutional rights and prejudiced him. Each comment, therefore, individually justifies 
an order vacating the conviction. Furthermore, as each additional incident of 
misconduct is considered, the aggregated prejudice becomes more obvious. As such, 
5 To raise a claim under fundamental error, the defendant must show that (1) one of his 
unwaived constitutional rights was violated, (2) the error was clear on the record, and 
(3) the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
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because of the multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court should vacate 
Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
B. There Is A Reasonable Possibility That The Two Incidents Of Misconduct Which 
The State Concedes Occurred Impacted The Jury's Determination, Thereby 
Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair 
Trial 
1. The Prosecutor's Comment Vouching For The State's Evidence 
Constituted Fundamental Error And It Alone Justifies Relief 
The State concedes that the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury 
"I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. I've been a prosecutor for four years, 
and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence I've presented." (Resp. Br., p.26 
(quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.120, Ls.13-16).) It contends, however, that this statement did not 
infringe on Mr. Anderson's constitutional rights. (Resp. Br., pp.26-27.) That is wrong, 
since, as Idaho's appellate courts have explained, when the prosecutor attempts to 
secure a verdict on factors other than the evidence presented, such as by placing the 
imprimatur of the State behind the evidence, the defendant's constitutional right to a fair 
trial is violated.6 Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368-69 
(Ct. App. 2010). Specifically in regard to vouching, the Ninth Circuit has put it best: 
"When credibility of witnesses is crucial, improper vouching is parlicularly likely to 
jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the trial."7 United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 
6 The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions as a 
matter of due process. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I§ 13. 
7 Given that the sequence of events in this case is highly disputed, specifically, whether 
Ms. Morrison invited Mr. Anderson to visit her trailer and whether the sexual intercourse 
was consensual (see App. Br., pp.2-9), this is the type of case where the testimony of 
witnesses is crucial. The case turns on which witnesses the jury believes. Therefore, 
this comment, which the State concedes is inappropriate vouching, infringed on 
12 
915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The Idaho Court of Appeals agrees, 
recognizing that "[a] prosecutor can improperly vouch for a witness by placing the 
prestige of the State behind the witness .... " Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 368-69. As 
such, this statement, which has been conceded, is misconduct, violated one of 
Mr. Anderson's unwaived constitutional rights by depriving him of a fair trial. See 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 368-69; Edwards, 154 F.3d at 921. As such, the first prong of 
the Perry analysis is satisfied. 
The prosecutor's statement transcribed verbatim, as well as the error therein, are 
also clear from the record. The fact that the State has conceded error indicates that. 
Thus, the only question remaining under Perry is whether the comment 
prejudiced Mr. Anderson. To show prejudice arising from prosecutorial misconduct, the 
defendant must demonstrate that there "is a reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. This standard does not 
require the defendant to show that the outcome would have been different, only that 
there is a reasonable chance that the verdict was impacted by the misconduct in some 
manner. See, e.g., State v. Day, _ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (Ct. App. 
January 24, 2013) (not yet final; pet. for review pending). In such situations '"[w]here 
the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record that the jurors could have 
reasonably entertained doubt as to the defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the 
prosecuting attorney might well have influenced the result, a conviction will be 
Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 
368-69; Edwards, 154 F.3d at 921. 
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reversed."' State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111 (1979) (quoting State v. Spencer, 74 
Idaho 173, 184 (1953)). 8 
Additionally, prosecutors are held to a high standard to avoid misconduct 
because when they engage in misconduct, the chances for prejudice are higher. 
See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985); State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 
713, 721 (2011). "[S]uch comments can ... jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried 
solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion 
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Carson, 151 Idaho at 
1 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19). Therefore, Idaho has long held: 
the limits on permissible closing argument apply most stringently to a 
prosecuting attorney .... 'The desire for success should never induce him 
to endeavor to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except 
the evidence in the case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from 
the law applicable to the same .... It seems that [prosecutors] frequently 
exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the 
verge of error, and generally, in so doing they transgress on the rights of 
the accused.' 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 
43-44 (1903)) (emphasis added). Therefore, since the chance of prejudice is higher 
when the prosecutor is committing the misconduct, the possibility that the jury was 
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's erroneous comment is more reasonable, and 
thus, the misconduct is more likely to constitute fundamental error. 
8 While Garcia and Spencer predate Perry's reformation of the fundamental error 
doctrine, their rationale is still valid. Compare Day,_ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.6, 
p.8 (not yet final). It demonstrates how a defendant is prejudiced by prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
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In this case, the district court pointed out that the evidence against Mr. Anderson 
was not overwhelming, but that it contradicted Ms. Morrison's testimony in several 
ways, then concluded: "I probably would have gone the other way [found not guilty]; but 
I mean, there was -- I have to say I was shocked by this verdict." (See Tr., Vol.1, p.142, 
L.16 - p.146, L.2.) Given that the evidence in this case was not overwhelming, it is not 
possible to say that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous statements had 
an impact on the verdict. The jury could have easily entertained reasonable doubts as 
to Mr. Anderson's guilt in regard, for example, to the issues with the evidence 
highlighted by the district court. As a result, there is a reasonable possibility that its 
decision to convict was influenced by the prosecutor's improper vouching. As such, 
Mr. Anderson was prejudiced by the prosecutor's vouching for the evidence. See Perry, 
150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8. Therefore, 
this statement, where the prosecutor invoked his experience in order to vouch for the 
State's evidence, telling the jury that "this is the best evidence I've presented," 
constitutes fundamental error. 
Once misconduct is shown to be fundamental error, relief should be granted 
unless the State proves that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716 (2009). The State has offered no argument in 
regard to harmlessness. 9 (See generally Resp. Br.) The failure to provide argument or 
authority constitutes a waiver of that argument. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 
(1996); see also State v. Almaraz,_ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.41, pp.16-17 (April 1, 
9 Mr. Anderson contends that, given the underwhelming nature of the evidence 
presented (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2), the same evidence demonstrating 
prejudice also shows that the misconduct was not harmless. 
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2013) (not yet final; pet. for rehearing pending) (holding that, where the State fails to 
specifically argue harmlessness, it fails to meet its burden in this regard). Therefore, 
because there was fundamental error caused by the prosecutor's improper statement 
vouching for the evidence, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
2. The Prosecutor's Comment Disparaging Defense Counsel Constituted 
Fundamental Error And It Alone Justifies Relief 
The State also concedes that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
disparaging defense counsel, telling the jury that he did not refer to Mr. Anderson's 
testimony during his closing because he "knows it's not a good story." (Resp. Br., p.27 
(quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121 L.6).) The State contends, however, that this 
comment does not implicate the first or second prongs of Perry. (Resp. Br., p.28.) For 
example, it argues the error in this statement was not clear on the record because it 
was not evident from those statements that the prosecutor was indicating that defense 
counsel elicited false testimony. (R., pp.27-28.) However, these sort of comments, 
which disparage defense counsel and the defense presented, do constitute fundamental 
error because they are designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jurors. 10 
10 The ultimate question in this regard is whether the statements had the effect of 
disparaging defense counsel. The intent to disparage need not be express, or even 
strictly present. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Urgings, 
explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors other than the 
evidence admitted at trial ... have no place in closing argument."); State v. Baruth, 107 
Idaho 657 (Ct. App. 1984) ("These statements had the effect-if not the intent-to 
disparage Baruth's attorney. . . . [W]e believe these statements were improper."). 
Therefore, if the result of a statement is that the reasonable juror could possibly have 
been influenced to decide the case based on the erroneous comment, rather than 
deciding the case on the evidence presented, the error is clear - such a comment 
constitutes misconduct. As such, the only question remaining is whether the defendant 
is entitled to appellate relief (i.e., whether the comments prejudiced the defendant). 
Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. 
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State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21 
(Ct. App. 2008). And disparaging opposing counsel is one way in which the prosecutor 
improperly inflames the jurors' passions and prejudices. Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21; 
see also State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. The 
prosecutor can also commit this kind of misconduct by disparaging or mischaracterizing 
the defense presented. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576. 
In this case, the error in the prosecutor's statement in this regard is clear, as he 
appealed to the prejudices of the jury by disparaging the defense presented, as well as 
the defense attorney's decisions in presenting that case: 
I found it interesting, too, that [defense counsel] in his closing he hardly 
even mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony. There was only one or two 
references to when he testified about his story. I find that interesting. I 
mean, all he did was argue to you that the police didn't do a good job. He 
never -- he never talked to you about his client's version of events except 
one or two times. Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's 
uncredible, and it doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his 
client's story, because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is 
[sic] because he knows it's not a good story. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121, L.6.) And while the prosecutor is able to point out 
weaknesses in the defenses case, "this can be done in many ways without attacking the 
defendant's counsel." Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. Therefore, those comments, even 
though they were made alongside permissible arguments, are still erroneous. 
Furthermore, they constitute fundamental error because they were calculated to 
arouse the passions against the defense. See State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 
287 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715 (Ct. App. 2003); see also 
Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576; Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. Those statements infringed on 
Mr. Anderson's constitutional right to a fair trial because a reasonable jury may have 
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taken the prosecutor's comments to mean it should be frustrated with the defense for, at 
least, wasting its time with an unbelievable story, or, at worst, presenting false evidence 
in an "uncredible" story. Either way, the prosecutor's comments call into question the 
fairness of the trial. See id. Such statements can also constitute fundamental error if 
they are so inflammatory that the jury "may be influenced to determine guilt on factors 
outside the evidence." 11 Id. As explained in Section 11(8)(1 ), supra, because the 
evidence was not overwhelming, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury 
entertained a reasonable doubt about Mr. Anderson's guilt and may well have been 
influenced in its decision by this improper statement. Therefore, this statement, by 
itself, constitutes fundamental and prejudicial error, and should result in vacating the 
conviction, since the State has not argued that this error was harmless. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8. 
3. The Two Errors Conceded By The State, When Aggregated, Are Sufficient 
To Demonstrate Cumulative Error 
Even if this Court determines that the two points of conceded error are ultimately 
harmless by themselves, together, they show that Mr. Anderson was not afforded his 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and, as such, his conviction should be 
vacated. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 
629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Since the State has conceded two incidents of error, the cumulative error doctrine 
applies in this case. Compare, e.g., State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 500 (Ct. App. 
11 As with the analysis on the prejudice prong of Perry, Mr. Anderson does not need to 
prove that the jury was influenced in this manner, only that there is a reasonable chance 
that it was. See Day,_ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (not yet final). 
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2008) (not reaching the cumulative error question because the court found that the 
defendant had not shown more than one error). It is not the presence of multiple errors, 
themselves, that justify relief, but the prejudice arising from that combination of errors. 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823 (1998). Since there is more likely to be prejudice 
when the prosecutor commits misconduct, Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151 
Idaho at 721; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury's 
decision was impacted by the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Furthermore, as the district court pointed out, the evidence was not 
overwhelming (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2), and as a result, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the jury had reasonable doubts about Mr. Anderson's guilt 
which were set aside because of the prosecutor's multiple improper statements. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction, which was obtained 
without affording him his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair 
trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, 
p.8. 
C. The Other Comments Also Constitute Prosecutorial Misconduct, As They Depart 
From The Proper Scope Of Comments On The Evidence To Inappropriately 
Interject The Prosecutor's Personal Beliefs Regarding The Evidence, Thereby 
Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Constitutional Right To Due Process And A Fair 
Trial 
The remaining statements of which Mr. Anderson complains do constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct, contrary to the State's contentions. (See App. Br., pp.20-26; 
Resp. Br., pp.18-26.) The State asserts that these comments were proper arguments 
based on the evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.18-26.) However, while these comments may 
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have been made alongside proper comments on the evidence, they were not 
themselves proper. 
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and 
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. A prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as 
to the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such 
opinion is based on the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise 
caution to avoid interjecting his or her own personal belief and should 
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from 
evidence presented at trial. 
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added). As such, 
while a prosecutor is allowed to make arguments arising from reasonable inferences 
from the evidence, when he interjects assertions of his own beliefs and opinions, 
throwing the imprimatur of the State behind the evidence in doing so, he is no longer 
making permissible argument; he is committing misconduct which undermines the 
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151 
Idaho at 721, Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369; compare Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 (finding 
misconduct when the prosecutor departed from permissible comments and disparaged 
opposing counsel). 
Most of the comments identified in the Appellant's Brief contain this type of flaw: 
the prosecutor may have made some permissible comments on certain topics, but 
departed from the permissible scope of argument to interject expressions of his own 
opinion, throwing his credibility, and thereby, the imprimatur of the State, (sometimes 
overtly, as discussed in Section 11(8)(1 ), supra) behind the evidence. In doing so, the 
prosecutor committed misconduct and violated Mr. Anderson's state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, even though he had also made 
permissible argument on those same topics. 
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1. By Vouching For The Credibility Of The State's Witnesses And The 
State's Evidence, The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct 
The most obvious of the remaining comments which constitutes misconduct was 
the prosecutor's vouching by expressly stating his opinion regarding the credibility of the 
nurse practitioner: "I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible." (See App. 
Br., p.21 (quoting Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.25 - p.97, L.1 ).) This is a textbook example of 
vouching, as "[c]losing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and 
beliefs about the credibility of a witness .... " Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369. Such 
comments "jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the 
evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the 
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the Government's judgment rather than 
its own view of the evidence."' Carson, 151 Idaho at 721 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 
18-19) Therefore, even though the prosecutor went on, as the State points out, to 
make permissible comments in regard to the consistency of that witness's testimony 
with that of other witnesses (see Resp. Br., p.20), the initial comment is, nonetheless, 
improper vouching. Compare Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 ("A prosecutor has every 
legitimate right to point out weaknesses in the defendant's case, but this can be done in 
many ways without [engaging in misconduct]," and concluding that when the prosecutor 
does depart from proper argument in this manner, the statements do constitute 
misconduct). 
In this situation, the prosecutor could have legitimately made all the other points 
about the consistency of the nurse practitioner's testimony with the physical evidence. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.97, Ls.2-21.) The error occurred when the prosecutor departed from 
those comments on the evidence and interjected his own personal comment as to that 
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witness's credibility: "I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1.) That statement is not a proper comment on the evidence; it is, 
according to Idaho Supreme Court precedent, misconduct. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369. 
Since this type of misconduct has been identified as directly infringing on the 
constitutional right to a fair trial, see Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Carson, 151 Idaho at 
721, the first prong of Perry is satisfied. As the error is obvious on the record, as it is a 
direct statement, transcribed verbatim, vouching for the witness's credibility, the second 
prong of the Perry analysis is also satisfied. For the same reasons discussed in Section 
11(8), supra, there is a reasonable possibility that this comment impacted the jury's 
decision, thereby prejudicing Mr. Anderson. As such, that statement constitutes 
fundamental error, and, as there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this error is 
harmless (nor has the State advanced an argument in that regard), this Court should 
vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction as a result of that misconduct. See Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8. 
There was also a third incident of vouching that is clear on the record. The 
prosecutor told the jury, "I mean, my gosh, this is great evidence." (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, 
Ls. 7-8.) That comment is not based on the evidence; it is the prosecutor's personal 
opinion. While this statement is not very explicit in its vouching for the evidence, even 
implied vouching is sufficient to demonstrate misconduct. See Beebe, 145 Idaho at 
576. As such, the prosecutor departed from permissible argument and interjected his 
own opinion about the credibility of the State's evidence, and constitutes clear 
misconduct. Therefore, for the same reasons the statement vouching for the nurse 
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practitioner justifies relief, this incident of misconduct should also result in an order 
vacating Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
2. By Disparaging the Defense And Its Theory Of The Case, The Prosecutor 
Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Conviction 
The prosecutor also made several other comments which departed from 
permissible argument and disparaged the defense presented. 12 These comments are 
just as improper as the concededly erroneous comments discussed in Section 11(8)(2). 
Just as the prosecutor is not allowed to disparage opposing counsel, he is not allowed 
to disparage or mischaracterize the defense presented. See Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576; 
see also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. That is exactly what these statements did, appealing 
to the passions and prejudices of the jury, resulting in the reasonable possibility, given 
the underwhelming nature of the evidence presented, that those comments impacted 
the verdict in this case, causing the jury to ignore the reasonable doubts they had and 
convict on information beyond the scope of the evidence. (See Section 1(8)(2), supra.) 
Therefore, for the same reasons discussed in Section 11(8)(2), these statements also 
individually justify relief in this case, as they constitute fundamental error, and were not 
12 "[T]he defense -- they want to come up with stories how they [Ms. Morrison's injuries] 
happened some way else -- happened some other way . ... And they come up with 
these stories that are not believable, but yet they throw them out to you and want you to 
believe them." (Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.2-7.) "So to bring this out -- again, when you don't 
have a good story to tell, and Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good 
story, and that was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything 
better." (Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23.) "That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've 
got to come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.) "You know, when the 
defense doesn't have -- when they have a defendant that comes up with an 
unbelievable story they've got to use smoke and mirrors." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10.) 
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harmless (nor has the State made any argument in that regard). Therefore, this Court 
should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
3. By Misstating The Law In Regard To The Burden Of Proof, The 
Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Which Justifies Vacating 
Mr. Anderson's Conviction 
Finally, the prosecutor made several statements which suggested that 
Mr. Anderson had a responsibility to present evidence in his defense, (i.e., that he 
had a responsibility to disprove the State's evidence). 13 The State's primary contention 
is that these were proper comments arising from the nature of Mr. Anderson's 
testimony. (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) While the prosecutor is permitted to make comments 
regarding the truth or falsity of the defendant's testimony, those comments must arise 
from the evidence itself. See, e.g., Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369. The prosecutor is not 
permitted to depart from the evidence and make comments which indicate that the 
defendant has a responsibility to present evidence. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 152 
Idaho 445, 482 (2012) (finding no error in the prosecution's statements which did not 
make such an indication). A defendant is not required, nor does he have a 
responsibility, to present any evidence at trial. Cf Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 
609-10 ( 1972) (holding a defendant need not disclose whether he intends to testify or 
offer defense witnesses before trial because he cannot be sure until after the State has 
presented its evidence whether such testimony will be necessary or helpful to his case); 
State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that neither direct nor 
13 Specifically, "[a]nd you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what 
do you do? You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to 
come up with some story .... [t]hat's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to 
come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19; Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.) 
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indirect comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence through his own 
testimony are permissible). 
In order to determine whether the prosecutor has departed from permissible 
argument "requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury. Whether 
a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in 
which a reasonable jury could have interpreted the instruction [regarding the burden 
of proof]." State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); abrogated on other grounds by 
Verksa v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). Therefore, the 
prosecutor commits misconduct in that regard if he makes statements which "diminish[] 
or distort[]" the burden of proof. 14 State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 
2010). Again, the question here is whether a reasonable jury could interpret the 
statements in this fashion. See Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 ("These statements had the 
effect-if not the intent-to disparage Baruth's attorney. . . . [W]e believe these 
statements were improper."); see also Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576. As such, the State's 
contention that the prosecutor had a legitimate intent behind those comments is 
unavailing. (See Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) 
A reasonable jury could interpret the statement "[you have] got to come up with 
something," in accordance with the definition of the term "have" in this context, which 
means "to be compelled or forced." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 
373 (2007). As such, the prosecutor's statement indicates the defendant was forced to 
present evidence in his defense, which is an incorrect statement of law. Those 
14 The Court of Appeals went on to find that this misconduct constituted fundamental 
error under a pre-Perry standard. Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685. 
25 
comments constitute misconduct, and since there is a reasonable possibility, given the 
underwhelming nature of the evidence in this case, that the jury would convict because 
Mr. Anderson failed to disprove the State's case, rather than holding the State to its 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they prejudiced Mr. Anderson. See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8 (not yet 
final). As a result, these comments are not harmless (nor has the State made an 
argument in that regard). Therefore, these comments each justify relief. As such, this 
Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction. 
111. 
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Anderson Of A Fair Trial 
Even if this Court determines that each of the prosecutor's improper comments is 
harmless in and of itself, the aggregation of improper comments by the prosecutor, 
including the two conceded to be error by the State, show that Mr. Anderson was not 
afforded his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. See Martinez, 125 Idaho 
at 453; Paciorek, 137 Idaho at 635; Vandenacre, 131 Idaho at 513. Since, in this case, 
the issue of guilt is debatable and, based on the record, the jury could have entertained 
reasonable doubt as to Mr. Anderson's guilt (see Tr., Vol.1, p.142, L.16 - p.146, L.2), 
the conviction cannot stand if there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecuting 
attorney's improper comments influenced the result. See Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111. 
The State responds, asserting that these statements should not automatically 
be given their most damaging interpretations. (See Resp. Br., p.30 (citing 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974).) The State is not wholly correct. 
While the Supreme Court did state that "a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor 
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intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting 
through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging 
meanings," Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647, that warning does not dissuade the courts from 
giving the statements an objectively reasonable interpretation. 
In the analogous situation of jury instruction, the courts apply the "reasonable 
juror" standard when questions of error in the instruction arise. See, e.g., 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979) ("whether a defendant has been 
accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction"); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 
(1985); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987); see also Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370, 379-81 (1990) (noting that the Sandstrom standard had not been strictly 
applied, but reaffirming that proper standard is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction [improperly]"). In Sandstrom, the 
United States Supreme Court held that "whether a defendant has been accorded his 
constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction." Id.; see also State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008), 
abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 
896 (2011 ), (applying the Sandstrom "reasonable juror" standard). 
However, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that the jurors could 
have interpreted the instruction in a permissible manner, and as such, further 
examination of the instruction given the potential reasonable interpretations was 
necessary. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519. It also rejected the government's assertion 
that the fact that the instruction could have been interpreted properly meant no error 
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occurred, stating "even if a jury could have ignored [the erroneous interpretation], we 
cannot be certain that this is what they did do." Id. at 526 (emphasis in original); see 
also Francis, 471 U.S. at 325 ("Because a reasonable juror could have understood the 
challenged [instruction in an improper manner] and because the charge read as a whole 
does not explain or cure the error, we hold that the jury charge does not comport with 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added). As such, while the 
courts will not presume that the jurors gave a statement its most damaging 
interpretation, they will not ignore interpretations which a reasonable juror may have 
given the statement. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has applied basically the same standard in 
prosecutorial misconduct cases: '"Where the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears 
from the record that the jurors could have reasonably entertained doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt and that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney might well have 
influenced the result, a conviction will be reversed."' Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111 (quoting 
Spencer, 74 Idaho at 184) (emphasis added). Because that is the rule, misconduct 
need not be express - it may be implied from the record. See, e.g., Beebe, 145 Idaho 
at 576 ("Urgings, explicit or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors 
other than the evidence admitted at trial ... have no place in closing argument."). The 
focus is on the effect the statements would have on the jury. Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657 
("These statements had the effect-if not the intent-to disparage Baruth's attorney .... 
[W]e believe these statements were improper."). Therefore, if the result of a statement 
is that there is a reasonable possibility that a reasonable juror could possibly have been 
influenced to decide the case based on the erroneous comment, rather than on the 
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evidence presented, the error is clear - such a comment constitutes misconduct. See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111. As such, the only question 
remaining is whether the defendant is entitled to appellate relief (i.e., whether the 
comments prejudiced the defendant). Baruth, 107 Idaho at 657. Therefore, if the most 
damaging interpretation of a statement is a reasonable interpretation of that statement, 
the courts cannot ignore the chance that the reasonable juror may have given the 
statement its most damaging meaning. 
Such a reasonable possibility exists in this case as a result of all the improper 
comments by the prosecuting attorney. Those comments, which addressed different 
aspects of the case, basically told the jurors that they should believe the State's 
evidence because the prosecutor is experienced and believes he presented good 
evidence on behalf of the State, and it was the defense's responsibility to present 
evidence disproving the State's evidence, but all the defense could do was present an 
explanation which defense counsel knew was unbelievable, if not downright false. 
As such, there is a reasonable possibility that this conglomeration of comments, in the 
face of underwhelming evidence, did influence the verdict in this case. Therefore, the 
accumulation of errors deprived Mr. Anderson of a fair trial, even if the individual 
statements did not. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction. See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226; Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; Day, 2013 Opinion No.6, p.8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on these errors, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that his conviction be 
reversed, or alternatively, that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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